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Lack of vaccine confidence can contribute to drops in vaccination coverage and subsequent outbreaks 
of diseases like measles and polio. Low trust in vaccines is attributed to a combination of factors, 
including lack of understanding, vaccine scares, flawed policies, social media, and mistrust of vaccine 
manufacturers, scientists and decision-makers. The Covid-19 crisis has laid bare societies‘ 
vulnerability to new pathogens and the critical role of vaccines (and their acceptability) in containing 
this and future pandemics. It has also put science at the forefront of the response, with several 
governments relying on academics to help shape policy and communicate with the public. Against 
this backdrop, protecting public trust in scientists and scientific output is arguably more important 
than ever. Yet, conflicts of interest (CoI) in biomedical research remain ubiquitous and harmful, and 
measures to curb them have had limited success. There is also evidence of bias in industry-sponsored 
vaccine studies and academics are voicing concerns about the risks of working in a CoI prevalent 
research area. Here, we set out to challenge established thinking with regard to vaccine confidence, by 
shifting the gaze from a deficit in public understanding towards probity in research relationships and 
suggesting an alternative and perhaps complementary strategy for addressing vaccine mistrust. We 
argue that a concerted effort needs to be made to revisit the norms that undergird contemporary 
vaccine research, coupled with a willingness of all stakeholders to reimagine those relationships with 




Immunisation is lauded as one of the most cost-effective public health interventions and a key strategy 
to reduce the spread of antimicrobial resistance
1
, and most recently, a critical approach to halt the 
Covid-19 pandemic. However, the success of this public health intervention not only depends upon 
how effective, accessible and safe it actually is, but also upon how it is perceived. 
Vaccine confidence is a term frequently used to describe the belief that vaccines are protective, safe 
and part of a trustworthy medical system2. In the past two decades, vaccine confidence has suffered a 
series of setbacks 3, prompting the World Health Organization (WHO) to recognise it as one of the top 
ten threats to global health4. Low vaccine confidence is attributed to a combination of factors, 
including lack of understanding, vaccine scares, flawed policies, the spread of anti-vaccination 
messages via social media5 and mistrust of vaccine manufacturers and decision-makers6. This crisis of 
confidence has led to drops in vaccination coverage and subsequent outbreaks of diseases like measles 
and polio3,7. 
Unlike therapeutic treatments aimed at curing or alleviating existing conditions, vaccines are designed 
to prevent a potential disease, which makes them particularly vulnerable to omission bias – the 
preference for harm caused by omissions (e.g. not vaccinating) over equal or lesser harm caused by 
acts (e.g. vaccinating)8. Omission bias can be exacerbated if people have reservations about the 
trustworthiness of the vaccine development, approval and implementation processes, especially when 
children‘s safety is at stake9. 
Challenges to vaccine confidence are global, but they are most salient in high-income countries 
(HICs)10,11, where vaccines and healthcare are more accessible, vaccine-preventable diseases are less 
prevalent and visible, and education levels higher. The impact of this trend is illustrated by the UK‘s 
loss of its WHO 'measles-free' status12 and France‘s move to make eight additional vaccines 
mandatory to increase uptake13. In adults, inaction or active vaccine refusal are more common, also 
resulting in inadequate coverage14,15. 
The first global survey on attitudes toward science found that low confidence in vaccines is also 
associated with distrust of scientists11. Our own analysis of this dataset revealed that only 33% of 
HICs participants trust ‗a lot‘ that academic scientists seek to benefit the public and 22% trust ‗a lot‘ 
that academics are honest about who funds their work16, suggesting low overall levels of trust in 
academic research. Lack of trust in scientists – particularly among those who distrust vaccines – adds 
a new dimension to the well-established literature on the links between vaccine uptake and trust in 
vaccines, government and vaccine manufacturers6,17.  
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The Covid-19 crisis has laid bare societies‘ vulnerability to new pathogens and the critical role of 
vaccines (and their acceptability) in containing this and future epidemics. It has also put science at the 
forefront of the response, with several governments relying on academics to help shape policy and 
communicate with the public. However, being at the frontline of a fast-moving epidemic could act as 
a double-edged sword. On one hand it can provide much needed expertise in support of governments‘ 
response and highlight the value of science, but on the other hand, if ‗science-led‘ policy decisions are 
opaque, flawed or inappropriately executed, or if experts‘ independence is questioned, it can hurt the 
credibility of academics and their work – and concerns have been voiced by some in the academy that 
the rhetoric of ‗science led‘ policy is disingenuous18.    
Against this backdrop, protecting public trust in scientists and scientific output is arguably more 
important than ever – and this not only requires us to take seriously and engage with peoples‘ 
concerns, but also to demonstrate trustworthiness. In the case of vaccines, however, most 
interventional efforts to improve vaccine confidence continue to disregard the potential legitimacy of 
people‘s concerns and focus on educating, incentivising or coercing them, with suboptimal results; the 
few randomised trials that have tested these approaches have shown they are minimally effective in 
increasing uptake and vaccine mandates have often backfired when confidence is low2. Notably, the 
behaviour of academics and vaccine manufacturers, as well as the nature and appropriateness of their 
relationships, remain largely under-researched and unchallenged.  
In this paper, we set out to challenge established thinking with regard to vaccine confidence, by 
shifting the gaze from a deficit in public understanding towards probity in research relationships and 
proposing an alternative and perhaps complementary strategy for addressing vaccine mistrust. Our 
intention is not to argue this will resolve all problems or should replace other strategies, but to point 
towards an approach that may be fruitful. In doing so, we also posit that a perceived 
information/understanding deficit is unlikely to work without tackling head on the question of trust 
and probity. 
Is a lack of trust in vaccine academics and their research reasonable?            
Science studies scholars have long theorised about the ways in which publics understand and accept 
science, and what happens when they do not. Of particular relevance here is Wynne‘s argument that 
people cannot be expected to trust science if the integrity of the institutions that underpin it is 
compromised:  
―One of the general dimensions along which people experience science, and along which they 
can have understandings of it which scientists typically do not recognise, is that of its 
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institutional structures of accountability, pluralism or hegemony, patronage, ownership and 
control. This logically affects the public‘s readiness to assimilate the contents of science‖19.  
Accepting this, we propose that lack of confidence in vaccine science needs to be understood within 
the context of an economic and political system that consistently favours the economically 
advantaged, which has led to widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of democracies and low 
trust in the elites20–22. A prominent beneficiary of this system is the pharmaceutical industry, which in 
recent years has become the most profitable industry sector23. Their success, however, has been 
underpinned by unethical behaviour and aggressive tactics that have tarnished their reputation24,25. 
Integral to the pharmaceutical industry‘s business model are collaborations with academia, which 
have led to the discovery of life-saving medical technologies and treatments – and which we have 
relied on to develop some Covid-19 vaccines26. This model began to take shape during the Reagan 
administration in the 80s, when the US Congress passed a series of laws – notably the Bayh-Dole act27 
– to facilitate the translation of publicly funded discoveries into successful products, several of which 
would end up in industry‘s pockets28. Different versions of this model have been adopted elsewhere29. 
Angell points out that before this pro-business shift took place, there were two clear and separate 
paths for scientists; they could either ―choose to live a comfortable but not luxurious life in academia, 
hoping to do exciting cutting-edge research or they could ―sell out‖ to industry and do less important 
but more remunerative work‖24. Since then, the interests of industry, researchers and academic 
institutions have become more entwined and, arguably, conflicting; and we suggest this is likely to be 
an important factor in public trust in vaccines. 
We understand conflicts of interest as ―a set of conditions in which professional judgement 
concerning a primary interest (such as a patient‘s welfare or the validity of research) tends to be 
unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)‖30. Although conflicts of interest do 
not always lead to unethical behaviour, it can compromise the integrity of academics and introduce 
biases that lead to harm. The insidiousness of such bias is well documented; even small gifts such as 
stationary or coffee can influence the behaviour of those at the receiving end, sometimes 
unwittingly31.   
A comprehensive report by the U.S. Institute of Medicine provided a sobering overview of how varied 
and ubiquitous financial conflicts of interest (for brevity, henceforth ‗CoI‘) was in medical research32 




Although there is little research on the impact of industry funding on the integrity of vaccine 
academics and their work, there is some indication that CoI are also prevalent and bias-inducing in 
this area of research. For example, 85% of vaccine clinical trials are sponsored by vaccine 
manufacturers and non-industry trials are over four times more likely to report negative or mixed 
findings than industry-sponsored trials33. Beutels also found that an industry-sponsored economic 
evaluation of vaccination scored worse in methodological appropriateness than a comparable non-
industry evaluation34.  
The facts are, however, mostly irrelevant, because in matters of trust, perception is all; and it is 
certainly a reasonable assumption that perceived CoI in vaccine studies will impact on the trusted 
status of vaccine academics and trust in the science itself.  An illustrative example of how the 
involvement of vaccine manufacturers in clinical trials and policymaking can not only sew mistrust in 
the science behind a particular vaccine, but also affect entire immunisation schedules, is the aftermath 
of the introduction of mandatory human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccination in the U.S. 
Although the adoption of school mandates was hindered by multiple factors, including the newness of 
the vaccine and the sexual nature of HPV, Congrove and colleagues found that the involvement of the 
vaccine manufacturer, Merck, was particularly damaging35. Dismay over Merck‘s intervention in the 
policy process, including the provision of funds to an organisation of female legislators that 
introduced many of the bills to mandate HPV vaccination, also put in doubt the government‘s true 
motivation ―to force pharmaceutical products on minors‖35. This was quickly picked up by a 
prominent anti-vaccine organisation, who accused Merck of deceiving the public and concealing 
important safety information36. Strikingly, a principal investigator of HPV vaccine trials for Merck 
and GlaxoSmithKline agreed that ―It seemed very odd to be mandating something for which 95 
percent of infections never amount to anything‖37. Further, a recent review showed that design 
problems in the HPV vaccine trials, most of which were led by academics but sponsored by industry, 
made it difficult to evaluate the extent to which the vaccine prevented cervical cancer38. These more 
recent developments are likely to increase public concern about the efficacy and safety of the HPV 
vaccine. 
Box 1. Key findings from the Institute of Medicine report on conflicts of interest 
Researchers fail to disclose payments from industry. 
Unfavourable results from industry-sponsored clinical trials led by academic researchers are not 
published.    
Academic researchers co-author manuscripts ghost-written by industry employees that report 
results from studies they were not involved in. 




This controversy has proven contagious, not only resulting in persistent low uptake of the HPV 
vaccine39, but also decreased uptake of other vaccines35. One response to these concerns – and a 
response that is typical of current models to increase vaccine uptake –  is not to engage with the issues 
that lead to lack of trust, but to assume that lack of vaccine confidence flows from a deficit in 
understanding and/or that people need to be pushed into it (with varying degrees of force). These 
models assume the problem is lack of knowledge and/or gullible acceptance of alternative facts, and 
as such, are unlikely to be effective if the problem is in fact lack of trust because (1) the people and 
institutions attempting to remedy the supposed problem are the very people and institutions that are 
not trusted and (2) where there is no trust, attempts to nudge or coerce are likely to be strenuously 
resisted. Yearly (in a systematisation of empirical environmental studies) cautioned that the costs of 
ignoring people‘s concerns are high and often long-lasting40. 
The introduction of the HPV vaccine in the U.S. is one of several examples of how distrust in a 
vaccine, and the causes of that distrust, can have wide and perduring consequences – including the 
extrapolation to other vaccines, with potentially catastrophic consequences for public health41–42, such 
as the recent drop in MMR vaccination in the Philippines (88% to 55%), largely due to reported risks 
of a new dengue vaccine43.  
Partnerships between academia and vaccine manufacturers can not only affect the trustworthiness of 
vaccines and vaccine science, but can also be costly for individual researchers, regardless of their 
discipline. In a recent commentary, a group of academics describe the ―hazards‖ experienced by 
vaccine researchers, including being ostracised by peers for challenging the status quo, being attacked 
by anti-vaccine groups and working in a CoI prevalent research area44. This resonates with the 
experience of one of us (ID removed) and anecdotal evidence from colleagues working in vaccines, 
some of whom have reported feeling conflicted and stigmatised by peers for receiving industry 
funding.   
While CoI and problems of bias in vaccine research are not new, their visibility has been significantly 
increased by accessible online information outlets and social networks. ―Collusion‖ between 
academics and vaccine manufacturers is a common grievance among members of the public or 
organisations who are concerned about or against vaccines45. Although high-profile basic researchers 
are frequent targets of criticism, the integrity of social scientists can also be called into question, as 
illustrated in Box 2.  
Despite the fact that vaccine actors are a clear source of concern about vaccines, and despite evidence 
of bias in industry-funded vaccine research that suggest some concern is reasonable, probity in 
academia-industry relationships and their impact on vaccine confidence have been largely absent from 
public health ethics debates. Instead, in line with much social sciences research, ethical inquiry has 
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centred on the behaviour of the public and the pros and cons of compulsory vaccination46–49, with a 
primary focus on changing wrong behaviour, as opposed to taking seriously and addressing the (at 
least prima facie legitimate and understandable) concerns that may lead to that behaviour.  
The current coronavirus epidemic is a stark reminder of the extent to which public health relies on 
public trust50. Yet, trust in public health interventions, in this case vaccines, is not formed in a 
vacuum; it is inextricably linked to the trustworthiness of the institutions involved in their 
development, approval and implementation6,11,51. It is, therefore, plausible that one of the reasons why 
containing vaccine hesitancy has proven so difficult is that little has been done to assuage legitimate 
concerns about the extent to which the motivations of experts, vaccine manufacturers and 
governments are aligned with the public interest.  
 
O'Neill argues that trusting should not be ―a matter of blind deference, but of placing – or refusing – 
trust with good judgement‖, which she refers to as ―well-placed trust‖54. We believe that vaccines are 
generally beneficial, although we acknowledge that not all vaccines are created equal. We also 
hypothesise that the public‘s scepticism is a reasonable response to the problems that are visible to 
Box 2. Examples of opinions from members of the public about vaccine researchers  
Twitter exchange in response to a comment from Peter Hotez, professor of paediatrics and 
molecular virology and microbiology  
@PeterHotez 
Wow, just wow: The evidence that #vaccines DO NOT & CANNOT cause #autism is detailed in my 
new book @amazon https://amazon.com/Vaccines-Did-Not-Cause-Rachels-Autism/dp/1421426609.  I 
think it's an outrage that the @thehill published this unbridled @antivax @antiscience viewpoint.  
Awful. #VaccinesWork 
@cgammicchia 
So y ou [sic] are saying the [Department of Justice‘s] ―expert‖ witness was wrong? They hid the 
information and covered it up! Just because it‘s in your pro-vax book doesn‘t mean it‘s correct. Plus you 
have a conflict of interest on this topic don‘t you?  #vaccinehavecausedautism 
@JakeLCrosby 
Petey was on @GSK's vaccine policy advisory board when he led a pro-vaccine petition against 
"misinformation," also around the same time @GSK stole medical records of Dr. Wakefield's patients 
and gave them to @DeerBrian52 
Rapid response to an interview with Heidi Larson, professor of anthropology, risk and decision 
science 
―It was interesting that Professor Heidi Larson expresses unease about those who take a questioning 
view of the vaccine industry and it‘s [sic] products. Many people, and I am one, have spent a 
professional lifetime reassuring parents that vaccines for children must be effective and safe, as the 
experts tell us that is so. Alarmingly, once one examines the evidence, or lack of it, that allows vaccine 
experts to be so confident, one discovers that the expected confirmatory evidence, for the safety and 
effectiveness of vaccines, is, very often, just not there… No doubt Professor Larson is aware of this, and 
those of us who realise that her Vaccine Confidence Project is partly funded by GSK can imagine the 




them in the vaccine industry and at least some lack of confidence in vaccines may be a marker of 
well-placed mistrust. 
Protecting the integrity of medical research: why is it so difficult? 
To our knowledge, no specific measures aimed at protecting the integrity of vaccine researchers and 
their work have been proposed or implemented. However, in the 2000s, calls led by U.S. academics to 
improve transparency and regulate interactions between industry, professional medical associations, 
academic institutions and their researchers31,55–57 led to some positive results. For example, top 
academic medical centres implemented restrictions to gifts, food, honoraria, etc. originating from 
industry58 and CoI began to be routinely declared in scientific journals. More recently, mandatory 
(U.S.) and voluntary (UK) publicly accessible registries have been created for declarations of interests 
between physicians (who may also work in academia) and the pharmaceutical industry59. These 
improvements in transparency, whilst certainly positive, will do little to demonstrate trustworthiness 
where there is already a lack of trust but, rather, such declarations will provide circumstantial 
evidence of reasons to withhold trust.   
Meanwhile, academia-industry collaborations continue to flourish, and researchers are still 
encouraged by universities and funders to develop links with industry60,61, with some expressing 
concerns about their reputations and income if industry support is curbed58. In some developed 
countries, the majority of panel members producing clinical practice guidelines have disclosed or 
undisclosed financial CoI62.  
A similar trend can be observed in vaccine research63, including Covid-19 vaccines64. Current events 
aside, in the UK, for example, a government-backed vaccine network is bringing closer together 
industry, academia and relevant funding bodies to make targeted investments in vaccines and vaccine 
technology65. Consequently, all aspects of most high impact, industry-sponsored clinical trials remain 
influenced by industry66 and systematically produce more favourable efficacy findings and 
conclusions than research supported by other sources32,67.  
With plenty of evidence showing how the pharmaceutical industry has directly (e.g. biased research) 
or indirectly (e.g. mistrust) threatened public health68,69, unregulated academia-industry relationships 
have the potential to inflict further damage during the Covid-19 pandemic and in years to come. This 
is because vigorous and urgent efforts to develop and produce Covid-19 treatments and vaccines, 
without appropriate and highly visible safeguards against conflicts of interest, could not only multiply 
and consolidate academia-industry relationships, but also fuel existing distrust in vaccine candidates. 
There is already some indication that the acceptability of Covid-19 vaccines may not be as high as we 
hoped. In recent polls, only 29% of people in the U.S. said they would definitely take the vaccine, 
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almost a third did not intend to vaccinate and were ―pretty‖ certain that more information will not 
change their mind, and intention to vaccinate was linked to confidence in the research and 
development process70. In the UK, over a third of people said they were unlikely to vaccinate and 
48% felt concerned about safety71, and intention to refuse the vaccine was linked to beliefs and 
perceptions reflecting scepticism about scientific experts and government72.  
An obvious reason why it has been so difficult to curtail CoI, is that there is no consensus among 
academic institutions about how to manage it73. This is reflected in substantial variability in the 
contents and detail of institutional CoI policies (when one is available), and the way these policies are 
enforced74. Notably, most CoI policies focus on disclosure rather than prevention. 
This ad hoc and light touch approach to CoI, however, is likely to be influenced by a constellation of 
often interrelated factors. Given the lack of agreement about how to manage CoI and how normalised 
academia-industry partnerships are, it is perhaps unsurprising that many academics are still confused 
about what relationships constitute CoI and appear to have limited knowledge about why they may be 
morally contestable75. Some argue that academic institutions have little incentive to regulate CoI, 
when the revenue generated by their partnerships with industry is so significant76. Others believe that 
the focus on disclosure in the medical sciences may confer on physicians and researchers a kind of 
moral immunity that exempts them from their duty to deal with the issues raised by CoI77. Thacker 
suggests that ―many scientists are incapable of understanding and accepting that financial conflicts of 
interest corrupt science because they believe that scientists are objective and too well trained to be 
influenced by financial rewards, like all other human beings‖78. 
Can the trustworthiness of vaccine science be improved? 
CoI in biomedical research is a complex and pervasive problem. Whilst CoI are not only caused by 
academia‘s relationships with industry, it is safe to say that these ties, in their current form, are a 
significant source of misconduct and mistrust45,67,68. The relationships between academics and vaccine 
manufacturers are particularly problematic, not only because they threaten the integrity of academics 
and science, but critically because they erode public trust in vaccines and put public health at risk. 
Certainly, overreliance on transparency (i.e. declaring CoI) as a strategy to improve trustworthiness 
has not been very effective. O‘Neill suggests that one reason why public distrust has grown in an era 
of openness, is the realisation that transparency may not curtail intentional misinformation that 
weakens relations of trust, and that it is the risk of deception, not lack of transparency, that is the real 
enemy of trust54. Transparency, albeit desirable, is not only insufficient to curb deception, but may 
also provide cover for it. Braillon rightly reminds us that transparency is just a tool, independence 
should be the goal79. Angell24 and, more recently, Moynihan and colleagues80 have proposed 
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evidence-based and actionable pathways to disentangle academia from commercial interests, which 
warrant careful consideration (Box 3). Cutting ties between industry and other key actors, such as 
government authorities and regulatory agencies, may help to improve vaccine confidence, but the 
arguments for this will be complex and are outwith what we can achieve in this paper. 
Given the lack of public debate about the need to improve the trustworthiness of vaccine research, or 
consensus about how to do it, there seems to be an obvious need to create a platform for public 
deliberation on the issue and to conduct high quality empirical research to explore trust and 
trustworthiness in vaccine development, and their impact on vaccine uptake. Understanding the 
problem holistically is an essential first step towards addressing it, and we suggest that one of the 
reasons that most contemporary attempts to address vaccine hesitancy have had limited effectiveness  
 
is the deep-rooted assumption that it is the behaviour of the public that needs changing, not the 
individual and collective behaviour of those charged with developing, approving, manufacturing, 
recommending and distributing vaccines. This is not to suggest that they systematically act wrongly – 
rather, that they do not take explicit and effective steps to demonstrate trustworthiness. A concerted 
effort, then, needs to be made to revisit the norms that undergird contemporary vaccine research, 
coupled with a willingness of all stakeholders to reimagine those relationships with an emphasis on 
demonstrating trustworthiness and probity. 
This discussion has inexorably transformed into a call to address a deficit in the research agenda – and 
turn a critical gaze on the relationships between the actors that seem to have the most to gain from 
maintaining the status quo. The ethical imperative for doing so is, we hope, now clear.  The status quo 
does not serve the public interest, and as long as it engenders mistrust, it threatens confidence in, and 
therefore the success of, one of our most effective public health measures. 
Box 3. Possible strategies to cut ties between academia and industry 
Governments require that evidence used for healthcare decision making is independently produced 
and all public healthcare organisations and their advisers (who may also be academics) have no 
financial relationships with industry80. 
Groups producing research syntheses provide reviewers with all available information on study 
methods and results and should be conducted without industry funding and by authors with no 
conflicts of interest80. 
Academic groups engaged in educational activities for health professionals or the public, or 
advocacy influencing regulatory or policy decisions, sever financial ties with industry80. 
Medical journals and their editors sever financial ties with industry80. 
Research funding agencies and academic institutions modify metrics and incentives to reward 
academic collaboration with public agencies and civil society80. 
An independent institute within a public research funding agency is created to administer clinical 




We acknowledge that protecting the integrity of vaccine researchers and their work will take 
significant resolve and effort, and possibly a paradigm shift in how academia and industry relate to 
each other. Yet, in these turbulent times, where ‗unprecedented‘ is a term routinely wielded, a serious 
questioning of science‘s institutional structures of accountability, pluralism or hegemony, patronage, 
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